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INTERPRETING “PLACE OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION” UNDER TITLE III OF
THE ADA: A TECHNICAL DETERMINATION
WITH POTENTIALLY BROAD
CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
MATTHEW A. STOWE
INTRODUCTION
In response to its finding that approximately forty-three million
Americans have one or more mental or physical disabilities, Congress
1
enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
Congress’s purposes in enacting the ADA were “to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
2
discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and to “bring
persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life.”3 To those ends, the protections Congress afforded to
the disabled under the ADA extend to numerous aspects of public
4
5
life, including employment, public services such as transportation,
and public accommodations.6
Title III of the ADA, the subchapter addressing public
accommodations, sets forth a general prohibition on discrimination:
“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
Copyright © 2000 by Matthew A. Stowe.
1. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 328 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213, § 12101(a)(1) (1994)) (finding that currently forty-three million Americans have one or
more disabilities and “this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older”).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. The
genesis of this seminal legislation was the recognition that, despite the extraordinary efforts of
advocates for the disabled, many disabled Americans lived their lives in intolerable isolation
and dependence. See id. at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 303, 313.
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
5. See id. §§ 12131-12165.
6. See id. §§ 12181-12189.
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privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.”7 Although the language
8
of Title III defines place of “public accommodation” and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has supplemented and clarified that
definition in applicable regulations,9 courts have expressed substantial
10
disagreement about its meaning. The principal point of contention is
whether the term “place of public accommodation” is narrowly
limited to physical places or whether it encompasses something
11
more. Because Title III prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation, a narrow construction of this term limits the
applicability of Title III and raises the question of whether such a
narrow construction comports with the express purposes of the
ADA.12

7. Id. § 12182(a).
8. Id. § 12181(7).
9. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999). The Attorney General has authority to promulgate
regulations under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b).
10. Compare Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that “places of public accommodation” are limited to physical places), with Carparts
Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
“establishments of public accommodation” are not limited to physical structures).
11. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing a
circuit split concerning whether “place of public accommodation” is limited to physical
structures).
12. Though the judicial resolution of the meaning of “place of public accommodation”
under Title III may appear to be a relatively minor determination, it has decidedly important
implications for the disabled community and may even more broadly impact civil rights
protections of other minority groups. To illustrate the practicality of this judicial determination,
consider the applicability of Title III’s nondiscrimination provision to insurance policies.
Insurance offices are specifically designated as places of public accommodation in the text of
Title III, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), and it thus violates Title III to discriminate against a
disabled individual “in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods [and] services” of an insurance
office. Courts construing “place of public accommodation” narrowly have held that because
employer-sponsored insurance policies are acquired at an individual’s workplace rather than an
insurance office, Title III does not apply to such policies. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13; Parker,
121 F.3d at 1010. Other courts have held that a broader interpretation of “place of public
accommodation” is required, noting that it would be “irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an [insurance] office to purchase services are protected by the ADA,” while those who
obtain their policy through an employer, by mail, or by the Internet are not protected. Carparts,
37 F.3d at 19; accord Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 299, 301-02 (N.D. Cal.
1997). In adopting this broader interpretation, courts have signaled that Title III guarantees the
disabled more than mere access to physical structures. See, e.g., Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins.
Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the plain meaning of the statute
demonstrates that Title III is not restricted to proscribing only the denial of physical access to
disabled persons).
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In Part I, this Note sets forth and briefly discusses the text of
Title III, focusing on the statute’s definition of “place of public
accommodation.” Part II extensively examines insurance-related
cases interpreting “place of public accommodation” under Title III.
Because most litigation regarding the meaning of “place of public
accommodation” has arisen in the insurance context, it is unsurprising
that most commentators have analyzed the meaning of the term in the
13
context of Title III’s applicability to insurance policies. However, the
debate over the meaning of Title III does not stop there, and if, as
some suggest, insurance policies require special treatment under Title
III,14 the interpretation of “place of public accommodation” in other
contexts should be further examined.15 Indeed, Section II.D
demonstrates that, although the insurance cases provide valuable
analysis, a normative definition of “place of public accommodation”
is better informed by examining cases beyond those involving
insurance claims. Accordingly, Part III examines a line of cases
determining whether membership organizations are “places of public
accommodation” and thus subject to Title III’s discrimination
prohibition. Part IV uses a hypothetical example to argue that “place
of public accommodation” under Title III should be interpreted
broadly. It argues not only that “places of public accommodation” are
not limited to physical places but also that the term should be
interpreted to include membership organizations with no ties to
physical facilities. Part V recognizes that this argument is in tension
13. See, e.g., Jill L. Schultz, Note, The Impact of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act on Employer-Provided Insurance Plans: Is the Insurance Company Subject to Liability?, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 passim (1999) (examining whether Title III provides disabled
Americans with a cause of action against insurance companies because of discriminatory
employer-provided insurance plans); Karen M. Volkman, Comment, The Limits of Coverage:
Do Insurance Policies Obtained Through an Employer and Administered by Insurance
Companies Fall Within the Scope of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 43 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 249 passim (1999) (suggesting that the policy underlying the ADA calls for a
broad interpretation of the statute so as to encompass employer-provided insurance policies).
14. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 380 (arguing that a DOJ publication specifically
addressing insurance policies under the ADA should be relied upon in insurance cases rather
than the DOJ regulations that ordinarily apply to Title III).
15. Other determinations that have directly turned on whether places of public
accommodation are limited to physical structures include, for example, whether a child with
attention deficit disorder could be excluded from a youth hockey league, see Elitt v. U.S.A.
Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 218 (E.D. Mo. 1996), whether a youth baseball league could disallow
a disabled a child with cerebral palsy to “play-down” in a lower age bracket, see Shultz v. Hemet
Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1996), and whether NFL television
“blackout” rules impermissibly deny deaf persons access to live broadcasts of football games,
see Stoutenborough v. NFL, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1995).
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with analogous jurisprudence interpreting “place of public
accommodation” under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) but
proposes means of reconciling this Note’s interpretation of “place of
public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA with existing
analogous CRA case law.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF TITLE III: TEXTUAL AMBIGUITY
Laden with ambiguous new legal terms,16 the ADA has become a
rich source of litigation in its short history. Rather than elucidating
the meaning of Title III of the ADA, court decisions and agency
regulations have heaped ambiguity upon ambiguity through
17
inconsistent use of Title III’s terms. Any effort to resolve intelligibly
the ambiguity in Title III must begin by analyzing its text.18
Section 302(a) of the ADA states that “[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”19 Although the statute does not technically define
“place of public accommodation,” it provides a list of private entities
that are considered “public accommodations” when their operations
affect commerce.20 In actuality, however, when the statute defines
“public accommodation,” it is in fact defining “place of public
accommodation”; a “public accommodation” is the entity that
operates, owns, or leases the place of public accommodation.21 Failure
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 1, at 59-60 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 267,
298 (identifying the House of Representatives’ concern that the bill contains vague and
confusing new legal terms, causing its interpretation to be conducted mainly by the judiciary
rather than Congress).
17. See infra notes 30-114 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 526
U.S. 434, 459 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Our precedents make clear that an analysis of
any statute . . . must not begin with external sources, but with the text itself.”); New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)
(stating “we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the
provision in question”).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
20. See id. § 12181(7).
21. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B., at 622 (1999). At this point, it is appropriate to clarify the
ambiguity in terms in order to establish a vocabulary for discussion. While section 302(a) of the
ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in places of public accommodation, see 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a), the statute defines only “public accommodation” but not “place of public
accommodation.” See id. § 12181(7). Substituting the statute’s definitional examples of “public
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to differentiate between these two terms has contributed to the
confusion in the law’s interpretation.
Because the central inquiry of this Note is whether places of
public accommodation are limited to actual physical structures, it is
important to examine the examples of places of public
accommodation provided in the statute.22 The examples of places of
accommodations” (e.g., theaters, libraries, places of recreation) into the text of section 302(a)
yields nonsensical results. Under such a technical application of the statute’s definition of
“public accommodation,” section 302(a) would prohibit discrimination against the disabled in
“any place of a theater” or “any place of a place of recreation.” Further obfuscating the
meaning of Title III is the fact that courts have used the terms “place of public accommodation”
and “public accommodation” interchangeably. See, e.g., Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-33 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating both that “the clear connotation of the
words in § 12181(7) is that a public accommodation is a physical place” and that “[t]he
establishments enumerated in § 12181(7) clearly show that a ‘place of public accommodation’ is
a physical place”) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to its authority under the ADA, the DOJ has promulgated regulations to
implement the provisions of Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994). In its regulations, the
DOJ attempts to resolve the ambiguity deriving from the text of Title III by clearly
distinguishing “place of public accommodation” from “public accommodation.” See 28 C.F.R.
pt. 36, app. B, at 622 (1999) (defining both “place of public accommodation” and “public
accommodation”). Indeed, the regulations indicate that when Congress defined “public
accommodation” in section 301(7) of the ADA, it was in actuality defining “place of public
accommodation.” See id. (“The term ‘place of public accommodation’ is an adaptation of the
statutory definition of ‘public accommodation’ in section 301(7) of the ADA . . . .”). The term
“public accommodation,” on the other hand, refers to “the private entity that owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Id. By drawing this distinction, the
DOJ is able to conclude that the discrimination prohibition of section 302(a) applies to public
accommodations in the context of their ownership, leasing, or operation of places of public
accommodation. See id. This resolves the aforementioned textual absurdity associated with a
technical reading of Title III; the substitution of the DOJ’s language into section 302(a) results
in a prohibition of discrimination against the disabled in the “full and equal enjoyment of the
goods [and] services . . . of any place of public accommodation by a public accommodation.” See
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). This not only avoids the nonsensical prohibition of discrimination
in, for example, “any place of a place of recreation,” but it develops an operative vocabulary for
a clearer discussion of the scope of Title III.
22. The full definition of “public accommodation” reads:
The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of
this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce—
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and
that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of
such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition
or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;
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public accommodation listed in the statute are divided into twelve
groups.23 For example, one category of entities that may be places of
public accommodation includes “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling
24
alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.” Those
examples are clearly physical places. In fact, most of the examples in
the definitional list, and arguably all, are actual physical places. Some
examples, however, such as “travel service,” are arguably not physical
places; such arguments are explored in Part II of this Note.
In addition to the definitional list provided in the text of the
statute, applicable DOJ regulations define places of public
25
accommodation as “facilities,” which, under a plain and ordinary
26
reading, are physical structures. Because the DOJ has authority to
promulgate regulations to implement the ADA,27 and because courts
defer to agency regulations that are not arbitrary or contrary to the
28
statute, the inquiry into whether places of public accommodation are
limited to physical structures ought to be relatively brief. However, an
abundance of judicial decisions disagreeing about whether places of

(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or
other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school,
or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
23. See id.
24. Id. § 12181(7)(L).
25. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 622.
26. See Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496, 498 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (“‘[F]acility’ . . . appears clearly to be defined as a physical structure.”) (quotations
omitted). Furthermore, the regulations define “facility” as “all or any portion of buildings,
structures, sites, complexes, equipment . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994) (declaring that “the Attorney General shall issue
regulations in an accessible format to carry out the provisions of this subchapter not referred to
in [section 12186(a)]”).
28. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84344 (1984) (stating that agency interpretations are given controlling weight by courts if they are
reasonable and not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
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public accommodation are limited to actual physical structures
suggests otherwise.29
An analysis of existing case law is warranted to help determine
not only whether places of public accommodation under Title III are
limited to actual physical places but also to determine whether they
should be. Moreover, in light of the DOJ regulations defining “place
of public accommodation” as a “facility,” cases holding that “places
of public accommodation” do not have to be physical places should
be examined to determine whether they fail to consider the
regulations, consciously disregard the regulations as contrary to the
statute, or accept the regulations with alternative reasoning for their
holding. Further, a finding that places of public accommodation
should not be limited to physical structures invites an analysis of
which non-physical entities could constitute places of public
accommodation.
II. INSURANCE CASES: THE EPICENTER OF DEBATE
Although Title III safeguards the right of disabled citizens to be
free from discriminatory treatment in a broad variety of contexts,
nowhere have complaints about violations of Title III’s discrimination
prohibitions arisen more frequently than in the insurance context.
Cases addressing the applicability of Title III to insurance policies are
numerous, dealing chiefly with a small set of issues: whether policy
provisions limiting benefits for AIDS-related illnesses are
discriminatory under Title III;30 whether it violates Title III for a longterm disability insurance policy to provide disparate levels of
coverage for mental, as opposed to physical, disabilities absent
actuarial support for such a distinction;31 whether refusal to insure an
29. See infra notes 30-114 and accompanying text.
30. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1999) (allowing a
claim against an insurer that limited benefits for AIDS-related conditions to $25,000 or
$100,000, while benefits for other conditions were limited to $1 million); Carparts Distribution
Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing a dismissal
of a claim against an insurer whose plan limited benefits for AIDS-related illnesses to $25,000);
World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that a policy cap
limiting lifetime benefits for AIDS treatment to $5,000 violated Title III).
31. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1998) (addressing a
plan that extended coverage for physical disabilities until age 65, yet extended coverage for
mental disabilities for a maximum of two years); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d
1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Conners v. Maine Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D. Me.
1999) (same); Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (S.D. Ind.
1998) (same); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same).
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individual based on disability, often in the absence of sound actuarial
data to support such a refusal, violates Title III;32 and whether it
violates Title III to charge a disabled person a higher rate for life
33
insurance without actuarial data supporting the higher rate.
Although the facts of these inquiries vary, the core question involved
in each of them is whether Title III’s nondiscrimination provision
34
reaches the content of insurance policies.
In answering this question, courts have first examined the
threshold question of whether discrimination in the terms of an
insurance policy is included in the penumbra of discriminatory
practices that Congress sought to proscribe in Title III. Looking to
the text of Title III, Congress’s explicit intent was to prohibit
disability-based discrimination in the access to “goods, services,
facilities . . . of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
35
accommodation.” Accordingly, several judicial inquiries have
focused on whether employer-sponsored insurance policies constitute
“goods” or “services” of a “place of public accommodation.” In
making this determination, courts have had first to decide whether
“places of public accommodation” are limited to physical facilities,
such as insurance office buildings, or whether they include non32. See Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565-66 (D. Minn. 1998)
(addressing whether a denial of long-term disability insurance to an applicant diagnosed with a
mental illness violated Title III); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 204, 209
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (examining whether an insurer’s refusal to issue a joint life insurance policy to
an applicant suffering from major depression violated Title III); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (deciding whether denial of life insurance to an applicant
based on the applicant’s partner’s HIV status violated Title III); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 429 (D.N.H. 1996) (addressing whether the denial of an application
for mortgage disability insurance based on the applicant’s past diagnosis of bipolar disorder
violates Title III); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(examining whether an insurer’s denial of life insurance policy based on the applicant’s spouse’s
HIV-positive status violates Title III); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL
573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (deciding whether the denial of health insurance coverage
to an eleven-year-old with a history of seizures violated Title III); Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp.
Ass’n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (adjudicating the question of whether the denial
of family health insurance to applicant violated Title III when the husband of the applicant had
received treatment for hypertension and hyperlipidemia and her son was a paraplegic).
33. See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190-92 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (addressing whether a life insurer’s charge of a higher rate for a policy to an applicant
suffering from fascioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy violated Title III).
34. Often the question is more narrowly focused on whether Title III reaches the content
of employer-sponsored insurance policies. See, e.g., Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008 (examining
whether Title III governs the content of an employer-sponsored long-term disability plan).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
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physical places like websites, telephone lines, or any other medium
through which insurance policies may be transferred. This question
has resulted in a circuit split and vigorous judicial debate.
A. Decisions Broadly Construing “Place of Public Accommodation”
In 1994, the First Circuit Court of Appeals was among the first to
address whether “places of public accommodation” are limited to
actual physical places in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v.
Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n.36 The plaintiff in Carparts had been a
participant in a medical reimbursement plan offered by the
Automotive Wholesalers Association of New England (AWANE)
37
since 1977. In 1986, the plaintiff was diagnosed as HIV-positive and
was subsequently diagnosed with AIDS in 1991.38 During this time,
the plaintiff submitted reimbursement claims to AWANE for
39
required medical treatment and medications. With knowledge of the
plaintiff’s illness, AWANE amended its medical reimbursement plan
(effective January 1991) to cap benefits for AIDS-related illnesses at
$25,000.40 For any illness not AIDS-related, however, medical
reimbursement benefits were capped at $1 million for each plan
member.41 The plaintiff sued AWANE, claiming that the amendment
to the plan violated anti-discriminations laws including Title III of the
42
ADA.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire denied the plaintiff’s Title III claim, stating that the
defendants, including AWANE, “simply do not qualify as ‘places of
43
public accommodation.’” The court explained that it “interprets this
definition of public accommodation as being limited to actual physical
structures with definite physical boundaries which a person physically
enters for the purpose of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services
therein.”44 Because neither AWANE nor the AWANE medical

36. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
37. See id. at 14.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 826 F. Supp. 583, 586
(D.N.H. 1993), rev’d, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
44. Id.
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reimbursement plan possessed these characteristics, the district court
denied the plaintiff’s Title III claim.45
Although the court of appeals in Carparts stopped short of
determining whether Title III actually governs the content of
46
insurance plans, it stated with certainty that the district court erred
47
in its narrow interpretation of “place of public accommodation.”
Examining the language of Title III, the court began its analysis by
noting that nothing in the plain language of section 301(7) of the
ADA requires a public accommodation to have physical structures
that persons can enter.48 Moreover, the court reasoned that the
inclusion of such entities as “travel services” and “service
establishments” in the list of public accommodations in section 301(7)
manifested Congress’s intent to include entities that do not require
persons to enter physical structures to receive services.49 Because
many “travel services,” for example, conduct their business by
telephone or mail, customers need not enter any physical structures
to obtain the goods or services of a “travel service.”50 The court thus
concluded that it would be irrational if customers who entered an
office of a travel service were protected by the ADA’s
nondiscrimination provision while those who purchased the exact
same services by mail or telephone were not: “Congress could not
have intended such an absurd result.”51
The Carparts court completed its holding that places of public
accommodation are not limited to actual physical places by examining
the purposes and legislative history of the ADA. The purposes of the
ADA, as stated in the text of the statute itself, are to “address the
45. See id.
46. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20 (stating that because of possible interpretations of other
sections of the ADA, “it is unwise to go beyond the possibility that the plaintiff may be able to
develop some kind of claim under Title III”). Because determining whether Title III reaches the
content of insurance policies requires a more extended analysis of multiple sources, this Note
also stops short of that determination.
47. See id. at 18-19.
48. See id. at 19 (asserting that even if the plain meaning of “public accommodation” were
not clear from the text, the term ought not to be limited to physical structures in light of
applicable agency regulations and policy concerns).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id. Another example of such an irrational result was provided in Lewis v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997). There, the court noted that “a department store
which could not refuse to sell shoes to disabled customers who visited the store’s downtown
business location could freely refuse services to disabled customers who ordered from the
store’s catalog.” Id. at 1165.
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major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities”52 and to “provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
53
disabilities.” Furthermore, Congress’s oft-quoted purpose in drafting
Title III was “to bring individuals with disabilities into the economic
and social mainstream of American life . . . in a clear, balanced, and
54
reasonable manner.” With this in mind, the court concluded that
limiting the applicability of Title III to physical structures that people
must enter to obtain goods or services would contravene the remedial
purposes of the ADA and frustrate Congress’s intent that disabled
individuals fully and equally enjoy the “goods, services, privileges and
advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the
general public.”55
Numerous district courts have adopted Carparts’s interpretation
of “place of public accommodation” and have even gone further than
Carparts in holding that Title III governs the content of insurance
56
policies. These courts have allied themselves with the First Circuit in
finding that nothing in the plain language of Title III limits it merely
57
to guaranteeing nondiscrimination in access to physical structures.
Notably, in a recent decision authored by Chief Judge Posner, the
Seventh Circuit adopted Carparts’s broader construction of “place of
public accommodation,” noting that places of public accommodation

52. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994).
53. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994)).
54. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 382).
55. Id. at 20.
56. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(stating that the reasoning of Carparts and other courts “suffice[s] to persuade this Court of the
applicability of Title III to Prudential’s denial of plaintiff’s application”); Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425-26 (D.N.H. 1996) (holding that Title III
“would extend to the substance or contents of an insurance policy where, as here, the plaintiff
has been denied access to insurance because of his or her disability”); Baker v. Hartford Life
Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (holding that Title III
applies when a plaintiff is not physically present at the place of public accommodation but has
contact with an insurer through his father by correspondence and telephone). But see Doe v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559-61 (7th Cir. 1999) (adopting Carparts’s broader
reading of “place of public accommodation” in a remarkably similar case, but holding that Title
III does not govern the content of insurance policies).
57. See, e.g., Conners v. Maine Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D. Me. 1999) (“[U]nder
the plain language of Title III, the Act would extend to the substance or contents of an
insurance policy.”); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(“Title III’s plain language does not refer to access to physical structures . . . . [and] does not bar
only discrimination in access to physical structures.”).
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include entities “whether in physical space or in electronic space.”58
Furthermore, many courts have echoed and augmented the First
Circuit’s analysis of the purpose, legislative history, and policies
underlying the ADA, strengthening the policy arguments in favor of a
broad reading of “place of public accommodation.” One district court
has commented, for example, that because access to adequate
healthcare is “integral to a disabled individual’s ability to participate
in society,” arbitrary discrimination in the terms of an insurance
policy runs afoul of the stated purpose of the ADA.59
Additionally, district courts have furnished arguments in favor of
a broad reading of “place of public accommodation” that are not
discussed in the First Circuit analysis. In Winslow v. IDS Life
60
Insurance Co., for example, the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota noted that limiting places of public
accommodation to physical structures virtually negates the
protections that the ADA provides for the mentally disabled.61 If one
accepts a narrow reading, the court explained, one would have to
accept that Title III’s protection of the mentally disabled from
discrimination is limited to the circumstance in which a mentally
disabled person is denied access to a physical structure.62 Another
court propounded a similar rationale for a broad reading of “place of
public accommodation”; under the ADA, “disabled” persons include
not only those with mental and physical impairments but also those
regarded as having such impairments and those who have a record of
such impairments.63 If Title III’s nondiscrimination provision
guarantees only physical access to places, “then many persons who do
not suffer from a physical handicap but are explicitly protected by
Title III could bring a Title III claim only if the public
accommodation took affirmative steps to block such persons’ physical

58. Chief Judge Posner stated:
The core meaning of [section 302(a) of the ADA], plainly enough, is that the owner
or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web
site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space) that is open to
the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once in,
from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do.
Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559 (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19).
59. World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
60. 29 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D. Minn. 1998).
61. See id. at 562.
62. See id.
63. See Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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access.”64 The court could not accept that Congress would have
intended such an “anomalous result.”65
Likewise, numerous courts have supported a broad reading of
“place of public accommodation” by referring to Title III’s definition
66
of discrimination in section 302(b)(2)(A). For the purposes of Title
III’s general prohibition of discrimination, the statute provides that
discrimination includes, inter alia, the “imposition or application of
eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual
with a disability” from full enjoyment of goods, services, facilities,
etc.,67 and “failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to
68
afford such goods [and] services . . . to individuals with disabilities.”
In light of these examples of discriminatory conduct under Title III,
some courts have found that limiting “places of public
accommodation” to physical places would render such language from
the ADA superfluous69 or irrelevant.70
Thus, beginning with the Carparts decision, courts have relied on
71
the plain language of Title III, applicable DOJ regulations, the
64. Id. at 1322.
65. Id. A narrow interpretation of Title III focuses chiefly on physical barriers that would
prevent persons with physical disabilities from entering a physical structure (e.g., inaccessible
aisles or non-navigable stairs for persons in wheelchairs). According to Kotev, such a reading
would be “anomalous” because it “would narrow the application of Title III to bar
discrimination against only some of the categories of persons explicitly protected by the ADA,”
for physical barriers are no impediment to those merely perceived as disabled or for those who
are mentally disabled. Id. at 1321-22.
66. See, e.g., Winslow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (analyzing examples of discriminatory actions
described in Title III); Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (same); Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1322 (same).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
68. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
69. See Chabner, 994 F. Supp. at 1190 (“Finding that Title III applies only to physical
barriers to entry would render meaningless the provisions providing for equal access to goods
and services . . . . [and] sections dealing with modifications . . . would similarly be superfluous.”).
In addition, the court noted that a “safe harbor” provision of the ADA for insurers would also
be rendered meaningless if Title III did not ordinarily apply to insurance policies. See id.
70. See Winslow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (noting that some ADA statutory language “would
be rendered irrelevant if Title III were held to apply only to physical access to public
accommodations”).
71. While the First Circuit stated merely that agency regulations weigh in favor of a
holding that places of public accommodation are not limited to actual physical structures, see
Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994),
other courts have used agency regulations as support for the further proposition that Title III
governs the content of insurance policies. See Winslow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 427 (D.N.H. 1996).

STOWE

310

10/17/00 1:29 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:297

purposes and legislative history of the ADA, policy rationale, and the
demands of textual integrity in order to justify an expansive
construction of “place of public accommodation.” Not surprisingly,
other courts have used these exact criteria to justify a diametrically
opposite construction.
B. Decisions Narrowly Construing “Place of Public
Accommodation”
In 1997, a highly divided Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, decided
Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,72 which has since become
the leading case adopting a narrow construction of “place of public
accommodation.” The pivotal issue in Parker was whether an
employer-sponsored long-term disability plan was subject to the
discrimination prohibitions of Title III.73 The long-term disability plan
in Parker provided benefits until age sixty-five for individuals
74
suffering from physical disorders. For persons suffering from mental
or nervous disorders, however, the plan only provided benefits for up
to twenty-four months, unless the individual was hospitalized or
receiving inpatient care at the end of the twenty-four-month period.75
A plaintiff suffering from severe depression brought suit against
Metropolitan Life, the insurer through which her employer offered
the disability plan, when her benefits were terminated after twentyfour months.76
The court began its analysis of the plaintiff’s Title III claim by
examining the statutory text, acknowledging the general
nondiscrimination provision in section 302(a) and the textual
77
examples of discrimination provided in section 302(b)(1)(A).
Agreeing that section 301(7) expressly lists insurance offices as places
of public accommodation, the court noted that the plaintiff did not
72. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
73. See id. at 1008.
74. See id.
75. See id. Other courts ruling on similar facts have adopted Parker’s narrow construction
of “place of public accommodation.” See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d
Cir. 1998) (holding that disability benefits provided to employees are not public
accommodations, and thus not covered by Title III); Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Having no binding precedent to follow . . . we regard
the Sixth Circuit’s approach as the correct one.”). But see, e.g., Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982
F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997) (adopting a broader view of “place of public
accommodation” under similar facts).
76. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.
77. See id. at 1010.
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seek a good or service of an insurance office but rather obtained a
benefit plan provided by her private employer that was issued by
Metropolitan Life.78 The court further stated that “[a] benefit plan
offered by an employer is not a good offered by a place of public
accommodation . . . . [because under section 301(7)] a public
accommodation is a physical place.”79 Likewise, the court added that
the employer-sponsored long-term disability plan was not a good
offered by a place of public accommodation because the plaintiff
could not physically walk into the offices of Metropolitan Life and
80
obtain such plan.
In adopting a narrow construction of “place of public
accommodation,” the Parker court relied on applicable DOJ
regulations. Previously, the Sixth Circuit had emphasized that the
prohibitions of Title III are limited to places of public
81
accommodation. Applicable DOJ regulations define “place of public
accommodation” as “a facility, operated by a private entity, whose
operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of” the twelve
categories listed in section 301(7).82 Regulations define “facility” as
“all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes,
equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks,
passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property,
including the site where the building, property, structure, or
equipment is located.”83 All of these are physical structures or places.
In light of these regulatory definitions, the court stated that it would
contravene the plain meaning of Title III to hold that places of public
accommodation are not limited solely to physical places.84 It followed
then that because there is no nexus between an insurance policy

78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1011.
81. See id. (citing Stoutenborough v. NFL, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995)).
82. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999)).
83. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104).
84. See id. (citing Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583); accord Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“The establishments enumerated in [section
301(7)] clearly show that a ‘place of public accommodation’ is a physical place . . . .”); Pappas v.
Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that places of public
accommodation, as defined in section 301(7), are all “‘places’ within the plain meaning of that
word”).
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offered by an employer and an insurance office building, Title III did
not apply to the policy.85
The court found further support for a narrow reading of “place
of public accommodation” in the DOJ regulations’ explanation of
86
These
Title III’s applicability to wholesale establishments.
regulations state that wholesale establishments are covered “as places
of public accommodation except in cases where they sell exclusively
to other business and not individuals.”87 For example, if a food grower
supplies food to a food processing corporation on a wholesale basis, it
does not become a public accommodation subject to Title III’s
provisions, but if it operates a roadside stand selling crops directly to
the public, it is subject to Title III with respect to operation of that
roadside stand.88 Parker likened an insurance company to a wholesale
crop supplier, reasoning that because Metropolitan Life provided
insurance on a wholesale basis to an employer and not to individuals,
the insurance company’s policies were not subject to Title III; “no
place of public accommodation” was involved.89
Parker also directly criticized Carparts’s rationale for a broad
construction of “place of public accommodation” as contrary to
90
proper statutory construction. Carparts reasoned that places of
public accommodation, such as travel services, could not be limited to
actual physical places, since it would be absurd for persons procuring
services at an office to have the protections of Title III while those
who procured the same services by phone or mail did not.91 Parker
asserted that in reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit
85. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; see also Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 204,
206 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (“While the physical structure of an ‘insurance office’ would be covered
under the Act, neither the insurance policy nor an insurance company is a ‘place of public
accommodation’ under the ADA because neither is a physical structure.”) (citation omitted).
86. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011-12.
87. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 623 (1999).
88. See id.
89. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011-12. The Parker court and others find further support in the
regulations for a narrow construction of “place of public accommodation.” These courts cite
DOJ regulations for the proposition that the ADA does not require entities to alter the mix or
nature of the goods that they offer to the public; it follows that the ADA cannot require
insurance companies to alter the nature of the insurance policies that they offer to the public.
See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998) (adopting the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Parker); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app.
B, at 630).
90. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1013-14.
91. See Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st
Cir. 1994).

STOWE

2000]

10/17/00 1:29 PM

INTERPRETING TITLE III OF THE ADA

313

“disregarded the statutory canon of construction, noscitur a sociis.”92
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis provides that the construction of
ambiguous terms should be informed by an analysis of accompanying
text “to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of
Congress.”93 Parker reasoned that because most of the places of
public accommodation listed in section 301(7) are clearly physical
places (e.g., theaters, hotels, grocery stores), the ambiguity in terms
like “travel service” and “shoe repair service” should be resolved by
also limiting them to physical places.94 Parker blamed the ambiguous
terms on an unimaginative Congress that “simply had no better term
than ‘service’ to describe an office where travel agents provide travel
services and a place where shoes are repaired.”95 A broad
construction of “place of public accommodation,” therefore, would
96
violate the doctrine of noscitur a sociis and the text of the statute.
Other courts, including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have
adopted both Parker’s analysis and its narrow construction of “place
97
of public accommodation.” In addition to the arguments set forth in
Parker, the Third Circuit noted that restricting “places of public
accommodation” to actual physical places is consistent with
jurisprudence pertaining to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,98
which prohibits other kinds of discrimination in places of public
accommodation.99 Although the breadth of “place of public
accommodation” under the Civil Rights Act has not been litigated
extensively, the Third Circuit noted that the few courts that have
spoken on the issue have adopted a narrow construction of the
term.100
92. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014.
93. Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1998) (aligning itself
with the Sixth Circuit regarding the definition of “place of public accommodation”); Erwin v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Having no binding
precedent to follow, and having considered the parties’ arguments and reviewed both Parker
and Carparts, we regard the Sixth Circuit’s approach as the correct one.”); Pallozzi v. Allstate
Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 204, 206-07 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Parker in support of its
conclusion that the ADA does not pertain to the underwriting practices of insurance
companies).
98. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 613.
99. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
100. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 613 (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269-75
(7th Cir. 1993); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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Although Parker is the leading case favoring a narrow
construction of “place of public accommodation,” the decision
reflected a highly divided court and included strongly worded
101
dissents. One dissenting judge criticized the majority’s narrow
construction of “place of public accommodation,” noting that
commerce is increasingly becoming electronic either through the
102
Internet, mail, telephone, or other communications media:
“Unfortunately, under the majority view, the same technological
advances that have offered disabled individuals unprecedented
freedom may now operate to deprive them of rights that Title .“.3(c3.3( ts that)7sthat)7(0.195
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portions of the DOJ regulations in its opinion,108 it seems unlikely that
the First Circuit was unaware of the agency’s resolution of the
ambiguity that inheres in the term “place of public accommodation.”
Rather, it is more likely that the First Circuit implicitly rejected the
Department of Justice’s definition of “place of public
accommodation” as “manifestly contrary to the statute.”109 The policy
and legislative history analyses conducted by the First Circuit justify
foregoing judicial deference to the agency interpretation in this case.
After conducting a normative analysis of the breadth of “place of
public accommodation” in Part IV, this Note will further examine
validity of these particular DOJ regulations.
D. Insurance Cases Need Not Turn on This Determination
Ironically, while the debate over the meaning of “place of public
accommodation” has been most vigorous in insurance cases, the
question of whether Title III applies to the content of insurance
policies need not turn on this determination. Although a
comprehensive analysis of all ADA provisions relating to the content
of insurance policies is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief mention
of alternative analyses will illustrate how Title III may reach the
content of insurance policies regardless of a court’s interpretation of
“place of public accommodation.”
A careful look at existing Title III jurisprudence reveals that a
court’s determination of the scope of “place of public
accommodation” is not a necessary predicate to determining whether
Title III governs the content of insurance policies. Or, perhaps more
appropriately stated, courts determining that the ADA governs the
content of insurance policies are not bound also to interpret “place of
public accommodation” broadly. As previously stated, a number of
courts have adopted a broad construction of “place of public
accommodation” and held that Title III governs the content of
110
insurance policies. However, the Seventh Circuit recently adopted a
108. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.202 (1993)).
109. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“[L]egislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”).
110. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(adopting a broad construction of Title III and rejecting Prudential’s argument that plaintiff had
no standing to pursue a Title III claim); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,
425-26 (D.N.H. 1996) (stating that the “plain language” of the statute supports application of
Title III to insurance providers).
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broad construction of the term while holding that Title III does not
govern the content of insurance policies.111 Also, while a number of
courts have constructed the term “place of public accommodation”
narrowly and held that Title III does not reach the content of
insurance policies,112 at least one commentator has argued that the
term should be narrowly limited to physical places and that Title III
113
does govern the content of insurance policies.
The mere existence of multiple avenues for achieving the same
result in existing insurance-related Title III jurisprudence does not
imply that each is equally analytically competent, nor does it imply
that analysis of the meaning of “place of public accommodation” in
such jurisprudence is unnecessary or tautological. Quite to the
contrary, the richest and most analytically rigorous examination of
the meaning of “place of public accommodation” emerges from the
insurance cases. Still, the ability of courts to achieve similar
substantive rulings while disagreeing on the construction of “place of
public accommodation,” coupled with unique considerations related
114
to insurance, invites further analysis before adopting a settled
meaning of the term. Specifically, important policy rationales at stake
in the meaning of “place of public accommodation” come into
sharper focus through consideration of Title III’s applicability to the
policies, practices, and eligibility criteria of membership organizations
and athletic competitions.
III. MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS
Outside of insurance-related Title III jurisprudence, a frequently
litigated issue is whether Title III applies to membership
organizations, such as the NCAA, or athletic programs and
competitions. Because a finding that an entity is a “place of public

111. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559, 564 (7th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that while the ADA prevents insurers from turning down applicants merely on the
basis of a disability, it does not prevent insurance companies from imposing “caps” for certain
diseases).
112. See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611-614 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-14 (6th Cir. 1997).
113. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 368-79 (arguing that “places of public accommodation”
are actual physical places and that Title III governs the content of insurance policies).
114. These unique considerations include, among other things, interpretation of a “safe
harbor” provision for insurance companies in section 501(c), consideration of actuarial
principles, and the DOJ’s statements regarding insurance in its ADA Technical Assistance
Manual.
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accommodation,” or operates a “place of public accommodation,” is
the jurisdictional hook on which the applicability of Title III hangs,
such a determination is at the heart of each of these inquiries. A brief
overview of selected cases addressing Title III’s applicability to
membership organizations will further inform a normative
determination of the meaning of “place of public accommodation.”
Title III cases frequently arise when a disabled plaintiff claims a
sports organization has violated Title III by failing to reasonably
accommodate the disabled person or by failing to make exceptions to
rules or eligibility criteria that otherwise exclude the disabled
person.115 For example, in one case the parents of a child with
attention deficit disorder sought permission from a youth hockey
league to allow the child’s brother or father to be on the ice with the
child during practices to help him focus.116 When the organization
refused to allow this accommodation, the parents sued, claiming a
117
violation of Title III. The court took a narrow view of Title III,
stating that in order to have a valid claim, plaintiffs must allege denial
118
of access to a physical place. Because plaintiffs alleged “denial of
participation in the youth hockey league instead of denial of access to
a place of public accommodation, i.e. the ice rink,” plaintiffs did not
have a valid Title III claim.119 Furthermore, the court held that
because membership organizations are unlike other places of public
accommodation listed in section 301(7), they do not satisfy the
statutory definition.120
Other courts have embraced this reasoning. In Brown v. 1995
121
Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, for example, a disabled
participant in a cross-country bicycle tour brought a Title III claim
against the tour organization when it prevented him from
participating after he refused to wear a bicycle helmet when operating
115. See, e.g., Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1116, 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (refusing to
grant an injunction against the NCAA, where a learning disabled plaintiff claimed the NCAA
violated the ADA by refusing to recognize a nonstandard, untimed ACT score for the purposes
of academic eligibility); Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496,
498, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant organization violated
the ADA by preventing his participation in a bicycle tour for refusing to wear a helmet on a
specially designed tricycle).
116. See Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 218 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 223.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. 959 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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a specially designed tricycle.122 There, the court stated that because
the plaintiff alleged denial of participation in the bicycle tour rather
than denial of access to a physical place, the plaintiff had no valid
123
Title III claim. Another court, likewise, held that the National
Football League, its member clubs, and the media are not places of
public accommodation because they are not physical places like those
124
listed in section 301(7) of the ADA. Essentially, these courts have
answered in the negative the question of whether membership
organizations
themselves
constitute
“places
of
public
accommodation.”
Other courts have taken the opposite view, holding, for example,
that a youth baseball league itself constituted a “place of public
125
accommodation.” In Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, the issue
presented was whether a youth baseball league violated Title III
when it disallowed an eleven-year-old with cerebral palsy to “play
down” in a lower age bracket.126 The court held that “Title III’s
definition of ‘place of public accommodation’ is not limited to actual
physical structures with definite physical boundaries. Therefore, [the
baseball league is] ‘a place of public accommodation’ under the ADA
irrespective of [its] link to any physical facilities.”127 This holding is
notable for two reasons: first, for the proposition that a membership
organization can be a “place of public accommodation,” and second,
that it can be a public accommodation irrespective of any close
connection to a physical facility. This second proposition distinguishes
the holding from most jurisprudence construing “place of public
accommodation” under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.128
Under the Civil Rights Act, membership organizations can be “places
of public accommodation,” but only if they are closely connected to a
particular facility.129
122. See id. at 498.
123. See id. at 498-99 (citing Stoutenborough v. NFL, 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995));
accord Elitt, 922 F. Supp. at 223 (rejecting plaintiff’s Title III claim because the plaintiff alleged
denial of participation in a youth hockey league rather than denial of physical access to the ice
rink); Treanor v. Washington Post Co., 826 F. Supp. 568, 569 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting plaintiff’s
Title III claim because the plaintiff alleged failure of a newspaper to review plaintiff’s book
rather than denial of access to a facility).
124. See Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583.
125. 943 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
126. Id. at 1223-24.
127. Id. at 1225.
128. See, e.g., Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1272 (7th Cir. 1993).
129. See id.
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Still, a number of courts addressing the applicability of Title III
to membership organizations have adopted the approach of the
courts that have spoken analogously on the Civil Rights Act. For
130
example, in Ganden v. NCAA, a learning-disabled athlete brought a
Title III claim against the NCAA for not accommodating his learning
disability in applying academic eligibility requirements.131 There,
citing a leading Civil Rights Act case, the court stated that “to
constitute a ‘place of public accommodation,’ a membership
organization must have ‘a close connection to a particular facility.’”132
The court further explained that such a close connection is
established if the organization is affiliated with a particular facility or
if membership in the organization “acts as a necessary predicate to
133
use of the facility.” Notably, this court also asserted that Title III
guarantees more than mere access to facilities and that a plaintiff’s
failure to allege denial of access to a facility is not fatal to a Title III
134
claim.
Thus, a few distinct views of the breadth of “place of public
accommodation” emerge from the cases addressing Title III’s
applicability to membership organizations. As discussed, some courts
have taken a narrow view, similar to that taken in Parker, limiting
Title III to guaranteeing access to physical places. At least one court
has adopted a broad reading of “place of public accommodation,”
similar to that in Carparts, holding that membership organizations
themselves can constitute “places of public accommodation.” The
third view illustrates a compromise: that membership organizations
can constitute “places of public accommodation” when closely
connected to a specific facility.
IV. SCOUTING FOR A SETTLED MEANING OF “PLACE OF
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION”
Resolving Title III’s ambiguous language in the context of its
applicability to membership organizations requires consideration of
various factors. Accordingly, to reach an appropriate interpretation of
Title III, this part considers legal axioms, the underlying purpose of
the statute, fairness, the effect of such interpretation, canons of
130. No. 96 C 6953, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996).
131. See id. at *13.
132. Id. at *29 (quoting Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270).
133. Id. at *29-30.
134. See id. at *25.

STOWE

320

10/17/00 1:29 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:297

statutory interpretation, and comparison with analogous
jurisprudence. The ultimate conclusion, that membership
organizations are, indeed, “places of public accommodations,”
requires the adoption of a broad interpretation of the term and calls
into question the authority of particular DOJ regulations.
By revealing the practical absurdities of particular constructions
of “place of public accommodation,” the following hypothetical
contributes to a reasoned distinction between the various possible
interpretations of the term. Suppose that the Boy Scouts of America
issued a mandate that disabled boys would no longer be welcome to
enjoy the goods, services, or benefits of membership in the Boy
Scouts on account of their disability or perceived disability.135 This
policy would violate the ADA only if Title III governs the policies
and procedures of the Boy Scouts of America. To establish Title III
subject matter jurisdiction, a court must determine that the Boy
Scouts of America is a “place of public accommodation” or that it
operates a “place of public accommodation.”
The Boy Scouts of America is a membership organization that
136
does not maintain a close connection to any structural facility. The
organization gives its members opportunities “to participate in group
activities and to develop a variety of skills, e.g., camping, cooking,
first aid, lifesaving.”137 Accordingly, activities could take place at any

135. One would think that this sort of mandate is entirely unlikely given its patent
unfairness and its effect of ostracizing a boy at the time in his development when he arguably
needs support most. That has not, however, prevented the Boy Scouts of America from issuing
just such a mandate with respect to exclusion of openly gay boys. The Supreme Court in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), held that in spite of a state nondiscrimination
law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Boy Scouts were entitled to exclude
openly gay persons from their membership based on the group’s First Amendment rights. See
id. at 2447. Key to this decision was the Boy Scouts’s ability to convince the Court that forced
inclusion of an openly gay Scout would significantly affect the group’s expression. See id. at
2448. Other than the Boy Scouts’s statements in the course of litigation that it disapproves of
homosexuality, there was extremely limited evidence before the Court that the Boy Scouts had
ever expressed any opinion on sexual orientation. See id. at 2453. Arguably, the Court allowed
the Boy Scouts to exempt themselves from civil rights legislation simply by stating that they
disagreed with the nondiscrimination principles embodied in the legislation as applied to gays.
See id. at 2453. Reading Dale this way would render virtually all nondiscrimination legislation,
including the ADA, voluntary and thus nugatory. The hypothetical presented in this Note
assumes that the Boy Scouts could not otherwise opt out of compliance with ADA by simply
declaring multiple times during the course of litigation that forced inclusion of disabled boys
would interfere with the group’s expression.
136. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1272 (7th Cir. 1993).
137. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1218 (N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 120
S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
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number of indoor or outdoor locations, although a “typical Boy Scout
gathering involves five to eight young boys engaging in supervised
interpersonal interaction in a private home.”138 If Title III does not
apply to the Boy Scouts, the organization would be completely
unaccountable for any discriminatory practices and procedures it
employed. That is, if Title III does not cover the Boy Scouts, the
organization could flatly exclude all boys with a disability, a history of
disability, or who are regarded as having a disability. An aggrieved
disabled boy attempting to integrate himself into the social
mainstream of American boyhood would be prevented from doing so
and would have no remedy in the courts.
It is axiomatic that remedial legislation, like Title III of the
139
ADA, should be construed broadly rather than narrowly. Without
belaboring the purpose and legislative history analysis previously
140
discussed in the insurance cases, the broad goals of the ADA
indicate Congress’s desire to provide a “comprehensive national
mandate”141 to eliminate disability-based discrimination and to “bring
persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
142
American life.” Few single instances of discrimination could more
fully remove disabled boys from the social mainstream of American
life than preclusion from full and equal access to, and enjoyment of,
the Boy Scouts.143 To construe the ambiguous statutory term in a way
that licenses organizations like the Boy Scouts to freely discriminate
contravenes the clear intent of Congress.
This hypothetical, though unlikely, demonstrates powerfully why
Title III must apply to membership organizations, like the Boy
Scouts, that do not maintain a close connection with a structural
facility. If Title III applied, it would work to remedy not just
egregious instances of intentional discrimination, such as the one
described in the hypothetical, but also merely unexamined or
thoughtless policies that subtly discriminate against the disabled, such
as rigidly enforced age requirements that adversely affect learningdisabled boys.
138. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1272.
139. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
140. See supra Part II.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
142. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22, 99 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
143. Since the Boy Scouts’s inception in 1910, over eighty-seven million youths and adults
have joined. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1200 (N.J. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
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Also, whether membership organizations like the Boy Scouts are
“places of public accommodation” (or operate places of public
accommodation) merely confers Title III subject matter jurisdiction;
it does not decide whether their conduct or policies in fact
discriminate and violate Title III. Subject matter jurisdiction simply
allows the court to reach the question of whether certain conduct is
discriminatory. In the insurance cases, for example, an insurer would
not be liable under Title III if its policies decisions were supported by
actuarial data. Furthermore, with respect to the sports cases, Title III
would not require organizations to make any exceptions for disabled
persons that fundamentally alter the nature of the sport or endanger
144
the health of other players. In addition, Title III does not require
any entity to undertake any measures to accommodate the disabled if
such measures would be an undue financial or administrative
burden.145 Because the substance of Title III protects potential
defendants from having to make unreasonable accommodations for
the disabled, courts ought not overprotect those who discriminate “by
imparting a stingy and narrow reading to the remedial statute at
146
issue.”
These factors, coupled with the purpose and legislative history of
the ADA, as evidence of Congress’s intent, weigh heavily in favor of
a finding that membership organizations without close ties to a
structural facility, like the Boy Scouts, either constitute “places of
public
accommodation”
or
operate
“places
of
public
accommodation.”147 Since application of Title III to these membership

144. See, e.g., McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir.
1997) (upholding an eight-semester eligibility limitation where a waiver of the limitation “would
work a fundamental alteration in Michigan high school sports programs”); Sandison v. Michigan
High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a claim that Title III
required a high school sports association to waive its rule limiting eligibility to students under
age 19 to accommodate a learning disabled student).
145. See cases cited supra note 144.
146. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1279 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s narrow interpretation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act).
147. In the context of a membership organization with no ties to a structural facility, those
findings are essentially the same. That is, if the Boy Scouts cannot exclude disabled persons
under Title III, that prohibition applies whether or not the Boy Scouts own, operate, or lease a
“place of public accommodation.” Alternatively, the organization itself could be considered the
“place of public accommodation.” In that case, the Boy Scouts (operators of “places of public
accommodation”) could not discriminate against the disabled “in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations” of the Boy Scouts
organization (a “place of public accommodation”). 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). This reading
comfortably fits within the text of the statute. The Boy Scouts example calls for the

STOWE

2000]

10/17/00 1:29 PM

INTERPRETING TITLE III OF THE ADA

323

organizations comports with Congress’s plainly stated intent to
eliminate disability-based discrimination and the doctrine of broadly
construing remedial statutes, it is the preferable approach. Finding
that membership organizations lacking a close connection to a
structural facility can constitute “places of public accommodation”
requires that “places of public accommodation” not be limited to
actual physical places. Furthermore, it requires that Title III not be
limited to guaranteeing mere access to physical places. A number of
the insurance-related Title III cases support both of these findings.148
Thus, the First Circuit’s broad construction of “place of public
accommodation” in Carparts (supported by the Seventh Circuit) is
preferable to the narrow construction of the term provided by the
Third and Sixth Circuits. Although each of the circuit courts
grounded its construction of “place of public accommodation” in the
text of the statute, applicable regulations, legislative history, and
public policy, the interpretation that avoids incongruous outcomes
outside of the insurance-related context ought to be adopted.
A notable objection to a finding that “places of public
accommodation” may be non-physical is that most, and arguably all,
of the examples in the text of Title III are physical places. According
to this argument, courts adopting the broad interpretation, such as
Carparts, cling to a contrived ambiguity in a few definitional examples
like “travel service” rather than using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,
which makes manifest that Congress spoke solely of physical places.
Membership organizations are so unlike the examples of “places of
public accommodation” provided in the statute, the argument
continues, that they could not have been within Congress’s
contemplation.
Two responses to that criticism support the broad interpretation
reached herein. First, while noscitur a sociis is a valid canon of
construction, one may also give independent meaning to each term
listed in the statute. Because noscitur a sociis implies a deliberateness
by Congress in selecting the words of the statute, one should presume
that the deliberateness of the word choice extends not only to the
entire corpus of the statute but to the individual words selected. In
rejecting the Carparts court’s determination that terms like “travel
service” and “shoe repair service” are not necessarily physical places,
determination that such membership organizations themselves constitute “places of public
accommodation.”
148. See supra Part II.
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the court in Parker mused that “it is likely that Congress simply had
no better term than ‘service’ to describe an office where travel agents
provide travel services and a place where shoes are repaired.”149 While
it is not unreasonable to allow context to inform ambiguity, Parker
essentially states that when Congress chose the word “service,” it
actually meant “facility” or “office” or “building.” But because
Congress, indeed, chose not to use a word like “facility,” resolving the
ambiguity that inheres in such words as “service” could be better
accomplished by integrating the purpose of the statute in question
rather than by borrowing meaning from surrounding words. Again,
the axiom of interpreting remedial statutes like the ADA broadly
supports the interpretation reached in Carparts rather than Parker.
Second, even if one concedes that all of the examples of “place of
public accommodation” listed in the statute (including “travel
service”) are physical places, that still does not mean that “places of
public accommodation” are necessarily limited to physical places.
Precedent exists for using the law’s purpose to guide its application
rather than strictly adhering to a textual list of terms. Consider, for
150
example, the U.S. Supreme Court case, Katz v. United States. There,
the Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment, which protects
“persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”151 Although all the protected items in the list are
tangible, the Court held that conversations overheard by wiretapping
152
are protected under the Fourth Amendment. Unlike persons,
houses, papers, and effects, conversations are distinctly intangible.153
The majority justified its holding by stating that “the Fourth
154
Amendment protects people, not places.” In a similar vein, a
dissenting judge in a Seventh Circuit case considering the application
of Title II of the Civil Rights Act argued that the Boy Scouts are a
“place of public accommodation”: “That Title II should turn on the
definition of ‘place’ is irrational because places do not discriminate;
people who own and operate places do.”155 In both cases, protection
149. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997).
150. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
152. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
153. See id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued that because conversations
are intangible, they are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. (Black, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 351.
155. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1282 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J.,
dissenting).
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against invasive or discriminatory conduct, not a strict adherence to a
list of examples, guided the interpretation of the law.
Having argued that “places of public accommodation” are not
limited to actual physical places, it is appropriate to revisit the
question of judicial deference to the DOJ regulations. As previously
discussed, applicable DOJ regulations define “place of public
accommodation” as a “facility” and further define “facility” by listing
undoubtedly physical places. Because the plain meaning of “facility”
is a physical place, and in light of the regulatory definition of
“facility,” a broad interpretation of “place of public accommodation”
confers no judicial deference to the agency regulations on this point—
that is, if a court recognizes a membership organization or any other
non-physical entity as a “place of public accommodation,” it is
rejecting a definition that is limited to “facilities.” Thus, although no
court has explicitly stated it, the regulatory definition is manifestly
contrary to the statute and merits no Chevron deference.156 Though
the regulatory definitions do not explicitly refute any text in the
157
statute, they create “gratuitously cryptic,” “self-referential” terms
that, if applied literally, would lead to outcomes manifestly contrary
to the purpose of the ADA.
V. INTERPLAY WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Because Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also employs the
term “place of public accommodation,” cases construing the statute
provide instructive analysis for courts construing Title III of the
158
ADA. The leading case construing Title II in this regard is a
relatively recent Seventh Circuit case, Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
America.159 There, the Seventh Circuit considered whether, for the
purposes of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Boy Scouts of
America constituted a “place of public accommodation.” Specifically,
the issue was whether the Boy Scouts could exclude members who
156. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (holding that courts are not required to defer to agency regulations when they are
contrary to the statute).
157. Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 484 (D.N.J. 1998).
158. See, e.g., id. at 484 (noting that “some courts have looked to Title II” for assistance in
interpreting Title III); Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (stating that
Title II cases “provide instructive analysis in Title III ADA cases”); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922
F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (applying Title II “for instructive analysis” of the plaintiff’s
Title III ADA claim).
159. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
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refused to profess a belief in a Supreme Being.160 In a 2-1 panel
decision, the court ruled that the Boy Scouts was not a “place of
public accommodation” because membership organizations lacking a
close connection to a physical facility cannot be places of public
accommodation.161 Like many of the ADA cases that adopt a narrow
construction of “place of public accommodation,” the Welsh court
focused on the physicality of places of public accommodation or their
close connection to physical places.162 This focus prompted a sharp
rebuke from the dissenting judge, who accused the majority of
163
irrationally focusing on places and not the people who discriminate.
A number of factors suggest that Welsh has been weakened since
it was decided in 1993. First, in adopting a narrow construction of
“place of public accommodation,” the Welsh court “placed significant
reliance on Title III of the ADA, concluding that Congress also did
not intend Title III to apply to membership organizations that are not
164
tied to a particular facility.” However, the court did not conduct an
extensive analysis of Title III and its accompanying regulations in
reaching this determination. Furthermore, because the case was
argued in 1992, the Welsh court did not have the benefit of the scores
of cases examining the meaning of “place of public accommodation”:
almost every Title III case interpreting “place of public
accommodation” was decided after Welsh, mostly notably the
decisions of the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits. One must at least
query whether the Seventh Circuit would revise its one-paragraph
determination that Title III does not govern such membership
organizations in light of the hundreds of pages of subsequent judicial
analysis of Title III.
Additionally, a recent Seventh Circuit decision arguably cuts into
a portion of the Welsh court’s analysis. In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
165
Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit asserted that under Title III,
“places of public accommodation” include not just physical space but

160. See id. at 1268.
161. See id. at 1270.
162. See id. at 1271.
163. See id. at 1282 (Cummings, J., dissenting) (“That Title II should turn on the definition
of ‘place’ is irrational because places do not discriminate; people who own and operate places
do.”).
164. 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK § 15.1.1
(3d ed. 1997).
165. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
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also electronic space.166 To support this proposition, it cited Carparts,
the leading case establishing that “places of public accommodation”
are not limited to actual physical places.167 By taking the emphasis off
of the physicality of “places of public accommodation,” the court
arguably undermined the Welsh court’s focus on the physicality of
“places of public accommodation.” That is, if a website or telephone
line can be a “place of public accommodation,” then perhaps it is
unduly limiting to require membership organizations to have a close
connection to an actual physical structure to be “places of public
accommodation.” Since the Welsh court relied heavily on the notion
that the Boy Scouts is not analogous to any of the places of public
accommodations listed in the statute, it may elect to reconsider that
view given that websites and telephone lines are equally unlike the
listed entities.168
Furthermore, tracing Welsh’s journey through subsequent Title
III jurisprudence raises questions about the strength of its analysis
with respect to Title III of the ADA. First, the court initially relied on
a then-unexamined interpretation of Title III, which now is merely
one of many such interpretations. Subsequent courts interpreting
Title III relied on Welsh as persuasive authority to support a narrow
construction of “place of public accommodation.” In effect, a oneparagraph consideration of “place of public accommodation” under
Title III in 1992 was relied on in shaping the breadth of the term
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, which, in turn, has been relied
on in more extensive analyses of Title III to support a narrow
construction of the term. Tracing the birthplace of the narrow
interpretation of “place of public accommodation” to the Welsh
decision is somewhat distressing in light of that case’s lean discussion
of Title III. It is also somewhat ironic for cases interpreting Title III
of the ADA to rely on a Title II decision that relied on a cursory
interpretation of Title III.
In light of these considerations, courts construing Title III, while
not ignoring the Welsh decision, ought not put undue emphasis on it.
But more importantly, if courts construing Title II of the Civil Rights
Act look to Title III jurisprudence in construing its terms, then a
166. See id. at 559.
167. See id. (citing Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12,
19 (1st Cir. 1994)).
168. For a separate discussion advocating the reversal of Welsh outside of the Title III
context, see Edward Bigham, Civil Rights – Seventh Circuit Permits Boy Scouts of America to
Exclude Atheist – Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1333 passim (1994).
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broad construction of “place of public accommodation” under Title
III could have a carryover effect into Title II jurisprudence. This has
important implications for a number of minorities. It would, for
example, subject the Boy Scouts and other similar membership
organizations to Title II, barring discrimination based on race,
religion, or national origin. This highlights the importance of
determining the scope of “place of public accommodation” under
Title III of the ADA.
CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSION
The resolution of ambiguous statutory text is a frequent source
of bitter disagreement in American jurisprudence. Contrary to a
number of courts that have adopted a narrow construction of “place
of public accommodation,” this Note places great emphasis on the
purposes of the ADA and the broad construction of remedial
legislation. The conclusion, that a “place” in Title III does not
actually have to be a physical place, no doubt provokes the distaste of
those tremulous at the thought of rampant unprincipled superlegislating by courts. In fact, a good example of a likely criticism of
this Note’s thesis is evident in Justice Black’s dissent in Katz:
I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite the
[Fourth] Amendment in order ‘to bring it into harmony with the
times’ and thus reach a result that many people believe to be
desirable. While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of
words lacks the scope, and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy
discussions and philosophical discourses . . . for me the language of
the Amendment is the crucial place to look in construing a written
169
document such as our Constitution.

Despite this type of criticism, which reflects valid concerns, a
stingy reading of “place of public accommodation” constrains Title
III’s application in a manner inconsistent with its fundamental
purpose. The conclusion that “places of public accommodation” are
not limited to physical places does not mean that virtually any entity
necessarily constitutes a “place of public accommodation.” Rather, it
focuses the application of Title III on prohibiting discrimination that
ostracizes disabled persons from the social and economic mainstream
of American life. Like the Civil Rights Act, the ADA protects
Americans against discrimination by people, not places. Accordingly,
169.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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the focus of Title III inquiries is properly placed not on the
involvement of a physical structure in the discrimination against the
disabled but on the discrimination itself.

